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Introduction
There are four principal motivations for examining whether information diffusion threatens market power in order to enhance financial access in the African banking industry.
First, compared to the rest of the world, there is a higher potential for penetration of mechanisms of information technology in Africa. Consistent with recent literature, whereas high-end economies in North America, Europe and Asia are witnessing saturation points in the growth of information and communication technology (ICT), there is yet considerable room for ICT penetration in Africa (Penard et al., 2012; Asongu, 2015) . This implies that policy can leverage on such penetration potential to address development concerns, inter alia limited financial access.
Second, banks in Africa are characterised by issues of surplus liquidity (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014) , which is paradoxical in the light of the experience of households and corporations with limited access to credit (Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012) . Some of the documented determinants of surplus liquidity include: lack of borrowing collateral, absence of bank accounts, lack of credit histories, absence of good infrastructure that may oblige bank branches in remote areas to hold cash in excess of statutory limits and the abuse of market power by big banks .
Third, information diffusion can reduce market power or limit data privileges and informational rents previously enjoyed by big banks. Big banks can use such advantages to set the price of loans above marginal costs in order to increase their profit margins. This intuition is consistent with Bergemanny et al. (2015) who have argued that the interaction of market power and information is crucial in comprehending the distribution of quantities and prices that result in economic equilibrium.
Fourth, recent literature has suggested that financial institutions in the African banking industry may be abusing their market power in order to limit access to finance (Boateng et al., 2016) . In other words, such financial intermediaries may be more concerned with enjoying a 'quiet life' 1 instead of increasing financial access . Unfortunately, Africa has not been given the scholarly attention it deserves. This is essentially because, as the continent with the most severe financial access issues, studies devoted to assessing the influence of market power in the African banking industry are sparse (see Table 1 ).
This inquiry therefore aims to complement existing literature and policy challenges by merging the four strands above in assessing how information diffusion dampens the potentially negative effect of market power on financial access in the African banking industry. The results are linked to have policies which should enhance access to mobilised deposits in the banking sector for both households and small businesses. This leads to increased consumption, investment, productivity, employment and ultimately economic prosperity.
The rest of the investigation is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses linkages between information flow, market power and financial access. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3 while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes with future research directions.
Information Diffusion, Market Power and Financial Access

Information diffusion and theoretical underpinnings
By playing a fundamental role in information diffusion, ICT improves governance and reduces the abuse of government power by facilitating transparency, openness and the freeflow of information between various institutions and departments in the government (see Hellstrom, 20008) . For example, in accordance with the narrative, mobile telephony enables:
(i) the free flow of information between citizens and authorities and (ii) direct involvement of citizens in processes of governance. In summary, advantages of a mobile phone can also be reaped in the banking industry because by making financial institutions more connected and up-to-date, it encourages customers to be more participative in the process of lending. Such could decrease the informational rents previously enjoyed by big banks.
Ultimately, information flow has the potential for decreasing the asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. On the one hand, ex-ante of lending, information distribution can mitigate the adverse selection of banks (especially big banks) by enabling them to be better informed about borrowers' creditworthiness. On the other, ex-post of lending, the potential for moral hazard can be substantially limited because the circulation of information improves transparency and accountability. Such should prevent borrowers from concealing activities for which they borrowed funds as well as the earning there-from.
In the light of the above, the role of ICT in reducing market power in the banking industry is not so different from how ICT decreases the abuse of power by the ruling elite. On the potential role of ICT in decreasing market power, Snow (2009, pp. 337-339) has documented some theoretical underpinnings. According to Snow, the historic dearth of ICT provided those with power and authority with privileged information and communication facilities that substantially constrained transparency and promoted corruption.
Conversely, the rapid diffusion of information (by means of ICT) has shrunk the secrecy barriers and rents by inter alia: altering cost-benefit calculations and increasing oversight. These propositions are founded on the intuition that information monopoly among the elite in government or banking industry is an avenue for the abuse of power. Hence, the decentralisation of information through ICT reduces opportunities for those in government and banking circles to take advantage of their privileged positions. The theoretical foundations are broadly in line with the growing number of papers on the interconnections between ICT, governance and the abuse of power on the one hand (see Boulianne, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 2014) and on the other, the evolving stream of literature on the relevance of ICT in collective action against the abuse of power (Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013; Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; Manacorda & Tesei, 2016) .
Market power and financial access
Issues surrounding the relationship between market and financial access have occupied an important part of scholarly research over the past three decades (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Maudo & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007; Boateng et al., 2016) . Such an interest from scholars was for the most part inspired by the inefficiencies associated with market power, notably: net losses in social and economic welfare (Maudo & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007) . According to dominant narratives in the literature, market power reduces investment, lowers savings, increases financial intermediation inefficiency and decreases avenues of economic prosperity (see Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Djankov et al., 2007) .
More recent evidence however suggests that in relation to banks with substantial market power, smaller banks are associated with lower interest margins (Beck & Hesse, 2006; Ahokpossi, 2013) . This suggestion is in line with Beck and Hesse (2006) and Ngigi (2013ab) who established that bank size substantially affects differences in cost of loans with associated interest rate spreads/margins. From a theoretical perspective it is expected that banks with higher market power are more likely to maintain lower margins of interest because of economies of scale and other inherent advantages associated with size. Large sized banks may however, pursue objectives of financial intermediation inefficiency with the core purpose of increasing their profit margins (see Mitchell & Onvural, 1996) . Unfortunately, the African continent is not receiving the scholarly attention it deserves in the literature on market power, despite being the continent with the most severe constraints to financial access. As summarised in Table 1, with the exception of the study by Ariss (2010) which has sampled a few African countries, the bulk of the literature on market power has not involved the continent. (Ariss, 2010; Boateng et al., 2016) . Steps to computing the index used in this study can found in Boateng et al. (2016) .
Following recent African ICT literature (Tchamyou, 2015) , we use two ICT indicators, namely: the mobile phone penetration rate (per 100 people) and the internet penetration rate (per 100 people). The adoption of these variables is consistent with stylized facts on the high penetration potential of ICT in Africa (see Penard et al., 2012) . The dependent variables used in approximation of financial access are: loan price and loan quantity. These are measured respectively with 'price charged on loans' and 'the logarithms of outstanding loan balances' (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010) . First, GDP per capita growth which takes business cycle fluctuations into account should positively influence loan quantity. Conversely, the expected effect on the price of loans is not easy to establish because such impact is contingent on both market dynamism and expansion. Hence, it is proposed that diminishing GDP per capita can influence both loan quantity and loan price in a scenario of decreasing demand. A negative impact may be expected from GDP per capita because over the past decade, GDP has been growing less proportionately than population growth (see Asongu, 2013) .
Second, we expect the density of the population to positively impact both dependent variables. This is because, from intuition, an increasing demand for loans owing to rising population density is likely to raise loan prices.
Third, the quantity (price) of loans should be logically decreased (increased) with inflation, other things being equal. To be sure, the rate of investment with associated demand for loans is expected to decline in periods of economic uncertainty (like rampant inflation).
Consequently, the interest charged (or price of the loan) is likely to fall during periods of high inflation. This perception builds on the evidence that investors are more encouraged with less ambiguous economic environments (see Le Roux & .
Fourth, the number of bank branches is expected to positively affect loan quantity and negatively impact the price of loans.
Fifth, raising the 'deposit to asset' ratio is anticipated to increase both the quantity and price of loans. This is primarily because mobilised deposits are the principal source of bank financing. Hence, more liquid liabilities increase interest rate margins and/or quantity of loans, since good organisation and asset-liability management are imperative for the mobilisation of such bank resources.
Sixth, anticipated effects from dummy variables which are used to account for the unobserved heterogeneity are not easy to establish. For instance, regardless of bank size (small versus (vs). big), financial intermediation can be associated with both positive and negative effects resulting from movements in the credit market, although the adverse experience of large financial institutions are expected to be mitigated by their more sophisticated management and coordination systems. Nevertheless, addressing challenges that are naturally linked to the complications of dealing with a larger customer base is likely to be a source of inefficiency for large banks. In the same vein, the influence of heterogeneity in ownership structure (domestic vs. foreign) and 'Sharia finance compliance' (Non-islamic vs.
Islamic) are contingent on a plethora of features such as: organisational mission and capacities as well as market dynamics.
Appendix 1 summarises the expected signs whereas Appendix 2, Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 show the definitions of variables (with their corresponding sources), the summary statistics and the correlation matrix in that order.
Methodology
Generalised Method of Moments: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions
The The empirical strategy adopted in this study is the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) . In essence, instead of employing the first-difference of the variables as instruments, the technique uses forward orthogonal deviations that have been documented in restrict instrument proliferation and/or limit over-identification (see Baltagi, 2008; Love & Zicchino, 2006) . A two-step procedure is adopted in place of the one-step process because it corrects for heteroscedasticity.
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation procedure for loan quantity. (1) and (2) are replicated when the dependent variable is loan price.
It is important to discuss restrictions in identification and exclusion that are essential for a robust GMM specification. In line with the recent literature, we consider all explanatory variables as suspected endogenous or predetermined while the time-invariant omitted variables are considered to be strictly exogenous (see . The identification condition is motivated by the awareness that it is not feasible for time-invariant omitted variables or 'years' to be endogenous in first-difference (Roodman, 2009b) 3 .
The statistical validity of the underlying exclusion restriction is investigated with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments. A failure to reject the null hypothesis of DHT implies that years or time invariant omitted variables explain loan price and quantity exclusively through the suspected endogenous variables. In the standard Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy, a rejection of the null hypothesis corresponding to the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) is taken as a signal of the invalidity of the employed instruments (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b) . This is not the case with the GMM with forward orthogonal deviations which employs the DHT as information criterion for exclusion restriction. Therefore, in the findings that are provided in Section 4, the exclusion restriction assumption is confirmed if the alternative hypothesis of the DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is rejected.
Instrumental Quantile regressions
The modelling strategy covered with the GMM strategy is based on mean values of loan price and loan quantity. This represents a shortfall of the implied blanket policies.
Moreover, the underlying blanket policies may not be effective across countries with high, intermediate and low existing levels of financial access unless they are related to their initial levels of loan price and quantity. It is important to note that modelling exclusively at the conditional mean of loan price and quantity is addressed with the Quantile Regressions (QR) estimation technique because it examines the linkages throughout the conditional distributions of the dependent variable (see Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & Samreth, 2012) . Such an approach to understanding credit access has recently been used in clarifying the nexus between information sharing and financial access in Africa (see . In the light of the above points, empirical studies that examine such effects with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are based on the assumption that the errors terms are normally distributed. This proposition does not hold in the QR approach. Furthermore, assessing the robustness of parameter estimates at several points on the conditional distribution of loan price and quantity is consistent when outliers are apparent (Koenker & Bassett, 1978) .
The  th quintile estimator of financial access is obtained by solving the following optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (3)
where
. Contrary to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of squared residuals, with QR, it is the weighted sum of absolute deviations that is minimised.
For example, the 25 th or 90 th quintiles (with  =0.25 or 0.90 respectively) are examined by approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of credit access or i y given i x is expressed as followed:
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This formulation is analogous to
in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the mean of the conditional distribution of loan price and loan quantity. In Eq. (4), the dependent The results are discussed in terms of marginal impacts, net effects and thresholds at which the policy variables (mobile phone penetration and internet penetration) influence market power to increase financial access in terms of loan price and loan quantity. For ICT to enhance financial access, marginal effects from interactions with market power should be 4 (Asongu & De Moor, 2016, p.9). negative and positive for loan price and loan quantity respectively. For example in the partial sample regression in third column of Table 2 , the net impact on average loan prices of using mobile phones to effect changes in market power is positive (0.014) 5 . By contrast, the corresponding marginal effect (or conditional impact of market power) is negative (-0.0007).
Empirical results
"First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided"
The implication is that a threshold of 54.285 (i.e., 0.038/0.0007) penetration per 100 people is required to reverse the sign of the unconditional effect of market power (0.038) from positive to negative. With respect to the average loan quantity regression, a threshold of 57 penetration per 100 people (i.e., 0.114/0.002) is required to counteract the positive impact of market power. These estimated cut-off points are within the mobile phone penetration range of 0.000 to 147.202 provided by the summary statistics. Interestingly, Internet penetration has no apparent impact on both loan price and quantity in all the regressions. Most of the significant control variables display the expected signs. .
The following findings can be established in Table 3 The following findings can be established in Table 4 on the role of internet penetration in reducing market power for financial access. Again, whereas no significantly relevant results are apparent from 'loan price'-oriented regressions, for 'loan quantity'-related regressions, there is a positive marginal effect and net a negative effect only in the 0.90 th quintile. The corresponding threshold beyond which the unconditional negative impact of market power on loan quantity could be reversed is 9.485 per 100 people penetration. Again, most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. 5 The net effect on the average loan price is computed from the interaction between mobile phones and market power on the one hand and unconditional market power effects on the other: That is 0.014 = ([-0.0007× 34.107] + 0.038). Where the mean value of mobile phone penetration is 34.107, the unconditional effect of market power equals 0.038 and the corresponding conditional impact of it estimated to be -0.0007. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) andAR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. nsa: not specifically applicable because the threshold effect is contrary to theoretical underpinnings. 
Conclusions and future research directions
This study has assessed how information diffusion dampens the adverse effect of market The decision to complement an estimation technique, such as the GMM-IV approach which is based on conditional mean values of the dependent variable with a QR method that is based on multiple points of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable is apparent from our findings. These have revealed that blanket policies of information diffusion for the purpose of dampening market power for financial access may not be effective unless they are contingent on the initial levels of financial access across countries.
A likely explanation as to why information diffusion reduces the adverse impact of market power on access to credit is related to the fact that innovative schemes such as mobile banking has helped to decrease the overly reliance on the formal banking sector for loans.
Such could encourage banks, especially the large size financial institutions to lower ( raise) the price (quantity) of loans in the formal credit market.
In the light of the above, the broad implications of this study are twofold: First, policies designed to boost ICT penetration in Africa would disproportionately increase the quantity of loan provided by the formal banking sector by reducing their market power in the African financial industry. Second, the statistically insignificant coefficient reported in the QR regressions for loan price is taken as an indication that ICT could be supplemented with other tools such as information sharing offices (involving public credit registries and private credit bureaus). Such complementarity should also be contingent on the initial levels of financial access in the country concerned. In summary, by adopting measures of universal ICT access, policy makers can substantially increase access to credit by households and corporations.
Such universal access schemes may include the liberalisation of the ICT sector aimed at speeding up internet connections at relatively low prices.
Future inquires devoted to improve extant literature can focus on alternative instruments with which market power can be dampened in order to enhance financial access in the African banking industry. For instance, the roles of information sharing offices, mobile banking and financial sector competition can be considered. 
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